How many tower blocks will be condemned?

[Liquid Goldfish]

It's been mentioned in lots of news reports that fire barriers must be installed in the cavity behind the cladding (between each floor) in order to stop the chimney effect. Does anyone know how they are supposed to work? I've looked at several diagrams but am still not sure. As far as I can work out they are made of a material that expands when hot - and therefore when there is a fire they expand and seal off the cavity and thereby prevent the flame from using the chimney effect to spread up the cavity. Am I correct here? Thanks.

 

Edited June 19, 2017 by oldsport

[chicker]

Have we heard from any of the panel installers that were working on the block. Surely they were quite a few of them . We need a super grass .

Maybe everyone concerned is in fear of prosecution but then again an off the record statement might start a riot.... 

 

[Riedquat]

3 minutes ago, chicker said:

Have we heard from any of the panel installers that were working on the block. Surely they were quite a few of them . We need a super grass .

Maybe everyone concerned is in fear of prosecution but then again an off the record statement might start a riot.... 

That isn't needed, there are undamaged panels at the bottom to investigate, whether anyone from the installation says anything or not.

[Liquid Goldfish]

22 minutes ago, oldsport said:

It's been mentioned in lots of news reports that fire barriers must be installed in the cavity behind the cladding (between each floor) in order to stop the chimney effect. Does anyone know how they are supposed to work? I've looked at several diagrams but am still not sure. As far as I can work out they are made of a material that expands when hot - and therefore when there is a fire they expand and seal off the cavity and thereby prevent the flame from using the chimney effect to spread up the cavity. Am I correct here? Thanks.

 

Finally found a clear answer! - this seems to be a market leading fire barrier:

"SIDERISE RH 'Open State' horizontal cavity barriers

Incorporates a continuous bonded intumescent strip to the leading edge and encapsulated in a weather resistant polymer film. In the event of exposure to fire, this expands and fully seals the designed ventilation gap formed at the time of installation between barrier and the rear of the cladding, in compliance with CWCT and NHBC guidance for air gaps up to 50mm."

[chicker]

53 minutes ago, Riedquat said:

That isn't needed, there are undamaged panels at the bottom to investigate, whether anyone from the installation says anything or not.

Wouldn't assume all panels were fitted with the same detailing. Different crews might have had different work practices, large sites will have people who are less diligent especially if work is difficult to inspect . 

53 minutes ago, Riedquat said:

That isn't needed, there are undamaged panels at the bottom to investigate, whether anyone from the installation says anything or not.

 

[BorrowToLeech]

1 hour ago, iamnumerate said:

I am sorry are you saying that things like this fire would not happen under a different form of Government or not?

Some things - expensive house prices - are caused by the type of Goverment we have.  Others come from the fact that no Government is perfect - I think the fire is the later - please explain why not bearing in mind Ronan Point etc.

I'm saying that this particular fire may ultimately be attributed to failings of neoliberal government (e.g. prioritising profit over safety and deregulation) although we don't know yet.   This fire may not have happened under a better government but it's too soon to say.

This is true regardless of the fact that other tragedies can happen for other reasons. That is a straw man. 

No government is perfect, but we've had a really terrible government for the last 30 years.

[geezer466]

2 hours ago, copydude said:

Well . . . not exactly. Britain opted out of the official EU scheme but still has its own relocation scheme for Syrians. 

Yes, direct from the refugee camps in Turkey and then only orphans.

If Syrians are here and they never came from a refugee camp then they entered illegally probably in the back of a truck.

The poor lad who was killed came in three years ago one would assume by this method as no other route seems open.

3 Years from an asylum application to social housing (when the average wait time is what?) and a University Education, didn't do bad did he and it demonstrates why the UK is such a 'draw'.

[billybong]

21 hours ago, geezer466 said:

The debate on the street is of no consequence even though the agitprop keeps trying to shift it into some sort of class war.

The only opinion which matters is the one which will be arrived at the by the judge-led public enquiry.

The debate on the street turned out to matter in the Hillsborough tragedy.  Some would say it was crucial for the truth to come out.  Took a very long time mind you.

Edited June 19, 2017 by billybong

[Riedquat]

1 hour ago, chicker said:

Wouldn't assume all panels were fitted with the same detailing. Different crews might have had different work practices, large sites will have people who are less diligent especially if work is difficult to inspect . 

Good point.

[billybong]

3 hours ago, oldsport said:

It's been mentioned in lots of news reports that fire barriers must be installed in the cavity behind the cladding (between each floor) in order to stop the chimney effect. Does anyone know how they are supposed to work? I've looked at several diagrams but am still not sure. As far as I can work out they are made of a material that expands when hot - and therefore when there is a fire they expand and seal off the cavity and thereby prevent the flame from using the chimney effect to spread up the cavity. Am I correct here? Thanks.

 

 

However I don't think they would make any difference as the fire seems to have spread leaping vertically outside of the cladding like the Dubai fire.

There have been other similar fires around the world.

 

 

Edited June 19, 2017 by billybong

[billybong]

3 hours ago, iamnumerate said:

I am sorry are you saying that things like this fire would not happen under a different form of Government or not?

Some things - expensive house prices - are caused by the type of Goverment we have.  Others come from the fact that no Government is perfect - I think the fire is the later - please explain why not bearing in mind Ronan Point etc.

With this particular fire a lot of the problems and consequences are associated with high rise blocks and the need to clad according to various requirements on insulation and appearance etc.  There are other associated issues as well of course including council competence, cladding installer competence etc but this fire wouldn't have been so serious if it hadn't been a high rise.

The blocks are needed to try to accommodate rapidly increasing population including mass immigration requiring immediate housing provision.  Added to which there's a claimed lack of land and any available land for building on is hugely expensive especially in London with the most expensive houses.

All parties have the same policies on this even when they claim they don't before elections they renege immediately afterwards.  As the policy is part of the ponzi the whole economic policy needs a complete rethink.  They think they've sorted out the high rise problem after Ronan Point then give it time for memory of the risks to fade and up pops another one

Edited June 19, 2017 by billybong

[pig]

6 hours ago, crashmonitor said:

Even had Labour been in power unbroken since 1997 events like Grenfell would still occurr because errors of judgement will always occurr. I'm sickened by this anarchist blame game. 

The main thing I imagine  Tories need worry about is their antagonism to social housing and how this event might be perceived. Other than that I wouldn't get too hung up on the parties.

Kensington and Chelsea is one of those areas at the epicentre of the land price bubble. Strong suspicion then that that is a factor driving the local councils decision-making on how public money is spent or isn't and who is listened to.

 

 

 

[billybong]

21 hours ago, slawek said:

It is not only cladding panels, insulation itself was not safe either. I guess the whole refurb was done in a way that didn't consider fire safety regs. There are also people external to the contractor who are responsible for checking if the work complied with building regulations.

I am rather surprised that very few experts from industry are explaining the situation. It is like the whole industry is hiding something.   

I think the actual regulations need to be considered as well. They might not be fit for purpose especially in the light of all the similar fires all around the world which seem to have been disregarded.  The panels might well have met the current regulations.

Hammond says the panels were banned in the UK but apparently that cladding or similar was used on 30,000 buildings in the UK so it's not just one council or one installer or one architect etc that used them on one building in the apparent knowledge that they were "banned".  I suspect part of the justification for using them might have been that they had been used in lots of places elsewhere and they were generally accepted and approved.

I think your final sentence might well be true.

Edited June 19, 2017 by billybong

[Riedquat]

21 minutes ago, billybong said:

Hammond says the panels were banned in the UK but apparently that cladding or similar was used on 30,000 buildings in the UK so it's not just one council or one installer or one architect etc that used them on one building in the apparent knowledge that they were "banned".  I suspect part of the justification for using them might have been that they had been used in lots of places elsewhere and they were generally accepted and approved.

The impresison I've got is that they're almost certainly legal in some places (e.g. no barriers to putting them on a bungalow). IMO a more likely explanation is that some got put up by people not fully aware of the regulations, then others followed for the reason you say.

[billybong]

49 minutes ago, Riedquat said:

The impresison I've got is that they're almost certainly legal in some places (e.g. no barriers to putting them on a bungalow). IMO a more likely explanation is that some got put up by people not fully aware of the regulations, then others followed for the reason you say.

Quite possibly.  That would suggest widespread incompetence and negligence by councils, building control, architects and installers etc on high rise all round the country. Not just those responsible for Grenfell House as suggested by Hammond in him saying that cladding was banned in the UK.

As the cladding when first introduced on high rise was actually quite "innovative" I'm sure that at the very least the first ones installed on high rise if not all would be very carefully considered in terms of the regulations then maybe the later ones would be justified by reference to the earlier ones and effectively rubber stamped.  Maybe.

In any event at this stage I wouldn't discount the regulations themselves being to blame/faulty and they shouldn't just be accepted as fail proof in working out why the fire happened.  It's still possible that the cladding met the regulations.  Then there's the issue of why the UK regulations apparently weren't amended in the light of the similar fires all around the world.

Edited June 19, 2017 by billybong

[slawek]

2 hours ago, billybong said:

I think the actual regulations need to be considered as well. They might not be fit for purpose especially in the light of all the similar fires all around the world which seem to have been disregarded.  The panels might well have met the current regulations.

Hammond says the panels were banned in the UK but apparently that cladding or similar was used on 30,000 buildings in the UK so it's not just one council or one installer or one architect etc that used them on one building in the apparent knowledge that they were "banned".  I suspect part of the justification for using them might have been that they had been used in lots of places elsewhere and they were generally accepted and approved.

I think your final sentence might well be true.

The law is very general

B4 – External Fire Spread. (1) The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building.

It was like that at least from 2000.

The are also detailed technical guidance document called "Approved documents" but following them is not mandatory.

This is an interesting document from 2000, which shows the parliament was aware about the problem. 

https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmenvtra/109/10907.htm 

Edited June 19, 2017 by slawek

[Riedquat]

32 minutes ago, slawek said:

The law is very general

B4 – External Fire Spread. (1) The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building.

I think where it gets a bit muddied is that the link you provided a few pages back also went on to imply that some low (but not non) combustible material could still be used. To comply with the bit quoted above other measures would need to be in place to prevent exactly what we saw happen from happening. The fact that it did happen by definition means that it didn't comply with limiting the spread, so I take that as meaning yes, it didn't meet the regs but the reasons may be more complicated than just the material used.

We go back to the post about oily rags (which wouldn't meet the low combustible part, but aside from that...) and that as long as you could demonstrate you can somehow install them safely, then why not? The problem was that it would be hard or impossible to demonstrate that they could be used safely without building a full size building and setting it on fire, so they wouldn't get used because it would be too hard to demonstrate that they met rule B4. So I think the question is what evidence was there that what was installed was believed to adequately resist the spread of fire? "We've come up with this system in theory, never tested it properly" wouldn't. Even "we've somehow demonstrated it works fine if properly installed, but it's easy to mis-installed without it being noticable" probably wouldn't either. Well, I say "probably". I don't actually know, so "hope" might be a better word.

Edited June 19, 2017 by Riedquat

[slawek]

1 minute ago, Riedquat said:

I think where it gets a bit muddied is that the link you provided a few pages back also went on to imply that some low (but not non) combustible material could still be used. To comply with the bit quoted above other measures would need to be in place to prevent exactly what we saw happen from happening. The fact that it did happen by definition means that it didn't comply with limiting the spread, so I take that as meaning yes, it didn't meet the regs but the reasons may be more complicated than just the material used.

We go back to the post about oily rags (which wouldn't meet the low combustible part, but aside from that...) and that as long as you could demonstrate you can somehow install them safely, then why not? The problem was that it would be hard or impossible to demonstrate that they could be used safely without building a full size building and setting it on fire, so they wouldn't get used because it would be too hard to demonstrate that they met rule B4. So I think the question is what evidence was there that what was installed was believed to adequately resist the spread of fire? "We've come up with this system in theory, never tested it properly" wouldn't. Even "we've somehow demonstrated it works fine if properly installed, but it's easy to mis-installed without it being noticable" probably wouldn't either. Well, I say "probably". I don't actually know, so "hope" might be a better word.

It is a job of a person approving the building to say whether the building meets building regulations. I guess this person is asking for some evidences and makes a call if they are convincing.  There are industry standards to test cladding systems. So if the system has passed the test and actual installation is done according to the system specification then it is safe to assume it is safe.    

[Sour Mash]

8 hours ago, ****-eyed octopus said:

One point I would make is that, had the cladding not been installed, the death toll would not have got into double figures. How installing this stuff ever got past regulations is beyond my comprehension.

 

I suspect the criteria employed by the council was whether or not it was aesthetically pleasing to the generally wealthy demographic who would be looking it it from their multi-million pound properties, not whether it protected the plebs within from fire.

 

[Riedquat]

11 minutes ago, Sour Mash said:

I suspect the criteria employed by the council was whether or not it was aesthetically pleasing to the generally wealthy demographic who would be looking it it from their multi-million pound properties, not whether it protected the plebs within from fire.

Maybe, but that doesn't mean that anyone thought "Nah, we don't care if they burn." Tendering for options to achieve even just the looks it would be reasonable to assume that any offers would be fine from that point of view. Obviously a lack of diligence somewhere down the line has occurred but whilst "we're only interested in what it looks like from us" may be the entire reason for the refurb (although insulation seems to be a big part of it too), rather than to provide any benefit to the people living there (not that living in a slightly less crappy looking dump is a downside) it's a leap to go beyond that.

[Liquid Goldfish]

4 hours ago, billybong said:

 

However I don't think they would make any difference as the fire seems to have spread leaping vertically outside of the cladding like the Dubai fire.

There have been other similar fires around the world.

 

 

A fire consultant guy was saying on the news yesterday that without the fire barriers you could still have a catastrophic fire like this even with fire resistant cladding because of the chimney effect - and as a result he wasn't certain that the wrong cladding had been used - it might be due to missing fire barriers instead. I just couldn't work out at first how you could have fire barriers and still have the cavity behind the cladding remain open - I'm not at all practical!. But I think I  finally worked out how it works i.e. they close themselves automatically by expansion when triggered by heat from the fire.

[copydude]

8 hours ago, Riedquat said:

 . . . the type of world you'd have to build to be certain that it doesn't happen would be awful to live in . . . and even then something would still occasionally slip through the cracks.

Sorry, disagree entirely.

This is a simple matter of technical compliance. It doesn't impact society at all. There's a right way to do things, or a wrong way. Those empowered chose the wrong way. They weaselled around the regs simply because they could . . . it's what Gordon Brown called, 'light touch regulation'.

'A world . . . awful to live in' ?? I grew up in a world where banks and building societies and buildings didn't crash and burn thanks to 'light touch regulation'.

Anyway, about that cladding.

Quote

 

Appearing on the BBC's Andrew Marr Show, Mr Hammond said: "My understanding is the cladding in question, this flammable cladding which is banned in Europe and the US, is also banned here."

John Cowley, managing director of CEP Architectural Facades, which produced rainscreen panels and windows for Grenfell Tower's cladding sub-contractor Harley Facades Ltd, said: "Reynobond PE is not banned in the UK.

"Current building regulations allow its use in both low-rise and high-rise structures.

"The key question now is whether the overall design of the building's complete exterior was properly tested and subsequently signed off by the relevant authorities including the fire officer, building compliance officer and architect before commencement of the project."

 

Oh dear, the wrong cladding just slipped through the cracks, Well, I don't believe that for a moment,

The council did not buy this stuff off a barrow in petticoat lane.

Do you honestly think someone selling a 2.5m product has no idea whether it's suitable or not for the application?

Do you honestly think a Government procurement officer spending 2.5m asks no questions at all? 

It's just spivtastic to believe no one knew nuffink, innit?

 

[stormymonday_2011]

Well one thing that apparently was not working was the Risers that enable the fire brigade to fight fires in the upper part of a tall structure. As a result the Fire Brigade seem to have been essentially limited in fighting the fire by how far they could run their hoses from street level. Risers are required to be installed and working by Building Regulations so if they were defective the question is how and when did they become so. In particular was it a result of the refurbishment work ? Anecdotally it seems most of the people up to floor 15 in Grenfell Towers, who were covered by the hoses got out, while most of those above did not. I would think the fact the Risers were not functioning properly is almost certainly going to be one of the areas where a corporate manslaughter charge is likely because there is very little ambiguity about how they should work unlike some other areas of the design.

Edited June 19, 2017 by stormymonday_2011

[Riedquat]

34 minutes ago, copydude said:

Sorry, disagree entirely.

This is a simple matter of technical compliance. It doesn't impact society at all. There's a right way to do things, or a wrong way. Those empowered chose the wrong way. They weaselled around the regs simply because they could . . . it's what Gordon Brown called, 'light touch regulation'.

'A world . . . awful to live in' ?? I grew up in a world where banks and building societies and buildings didn't crash and burn thanks to 'light touch regulation'.

Great. Now think about it a bit more. First of all, yes, technical compliance does impact society, a lot. There is not a simple right or wrong way to do things. There are multitudes of ways, with various strengths and weaknesses. How far down that line do you want to dictate how everything should be done? Next, think about the level of inspection, official approval etc. required to make sure absolutely everything is done properly (and even then you'll never 100% guarantee it). Police state here we come.

People screwed up, badly, in this case, and need to answer for it. Don't however use it to go down the path of "anything is justified if it's in the name of safety." If you want to live in a world where everything is controlled to the last detail be my guest. I don't, and I don't even want to get close to that. And if you don't want to get close to that then cockups will happen. That does not mean shrugging my shoulders and doing nothing about it, but the harsh truth is that occasionally very bad things will happen.

Edited June 19, 2017 by Riedquat

[ChumpusRex]

3 hours ago, Riedquat said:

I think where it gets a bit muddied is that the link you provided a few pages back also went on to imply that some low (but not non) combustible material could still be used. To comply with the bit quoted above other measures would need to be in place to prevent exactly what we saw happen from happening. The fact that it did happen by definition means that it didn't comply with limiting the spread, so I take that as meaning yes, it didn't meet the regs but the reasons may be more complicated than just the material used.

We go back to the post about oily rags (which wouldn't meet the low combustible part, but aside from that...) and that as long as you could demonstrate you can somehow install them safely, then why not? The problem was that it would be hard or impossible to demonstrate that they could be used safely without building a full size building and setting it on fire, so they wouldn't get used because it would be too hard to demonstrate that they met rule B4. So I think the question is what evidence was there that what was installed was believed to adequately resist the spread of fire? "We've come up with this system in theory, never tested it properly" wouldn't. Even "we've somehow demonstrated it works fine if properly installed, but it's easy to mis-installed without it being noticable" probably wouldn't either. Well, I say "probably". I don't actually know, so "hope" might be a better word.

Again, it comes down to the options for compliance. The law is general, but approved document B gives you several options as to how to be compliant.

You can use non-combustible or "limited combustibility" materials (essentially materials which are mostly non-combustible, with small amounts of organic filler - e.g. mineral wool treated with a shape-retaining adhesive) as required in paragrah B12.7.

However, B12.5 allows you to ignore paragraphs B12.6-12.9, if you can demonstrate in large scale testing (BS8414) that your complete engineered system resists the spread of fire adequately to the levels required by the BRE (BR 135) document.

Although the latter "performance" requirement is nice in theory, I wonder if this disaster indicates that there are too many subtleties, which make it prone to error and that it may be difficult to enforce. For example, the overall performance is highly dependent on the materials, design, and construction, and these may interact in complex ways, which may not be easy to predict. At the same time, it can lead to confusion, as combustible materials may be acceptable in some circumstances but not others. 

The cladding manufacturers do provide examples of systems which have been tested to BS8414, or which, based on expert opinion, are expected to comply without testing.  For example: http://www.kingspaninsulation.co.uk/getattachment/dc8cf2c7-5e23-4d9a-9a1f-96bdf571ecdd/Techncial-Bulletin--Routes-to-Compliance--Fire-Saf.aspx

On page 22, you'll see there is an example cladding system design using ACM rainscreen (but you'll notice that it specified "FR" grade).

I head some talking head today on the news saying that they reckon that the architect's specification was wrong, in that it didn't specify "FR" grade. As a result, normal grade polyethylene rainscreen got installed. The fact that building control didn't pick this up is a concern, but it goes back to my point that the performance based approach may simply be too complex to be enforced reliably.