The Atlantic Ruling Class

[scepticus]

From the introduction

In the course of the 1960s accumulation conditions in the Atlantic area were more or less equalized, blocking the trans-Atlantic escape routes for American productive capital by eliminating the gap between US and European production conditions. As part of the same development, the profit share of bank capital climbed drastically in all countries involved, and rentier incomes revived as well. By the time Richard Nixon cut the dollar from gold in August, 1971 and thus set free an exponential growth of the mass of international liquidity, banks in practically all countries in the area had already been liberated from the Keynesian shackles imposed on them in the 1930s, or were soon to do so. The unimpeded international circulation of capital which had been the aim of the architects of Atlantic integration was finally realized - at the price of the system itself. Thrown into the rapidly widening channels of international credit, the mass of savings centralized by Atlantic bank capital served to facilitate the transfer of key segments of the productive apparatus of the North Atlantic heartland to new zones of implantation in the periphery.

This wave of internationalization, which widened the scope of the present crisis, also destroyed the very structure of Atlantic integration. By breaking the territorial coincidence of mass production and mass consumption, it undermined the capital-labour compromise and the complementarity of circulation relations; by allowing untrammeled competition in the search for new outlets for capital, and in the mobilization of peripheral elites, it destroyed the fundamental unity of purpose which had hitherto constituted the cornerstone of the hegemonial strategy of the Atlantic bourgeoisie.

[D.C.]

Sounds interesting but a bit communist.

got a linky to read online?

[scepticus]

The objectivity, and the potential 'general' relevance of a concept of control, reside in the timeliness of the main elements in its programme, combining momentarily feasible and desired - if hardly ever mutually compatible - strategies of labour relations, competition, and domestic and international politics. The compromises underlying the feasibility of these various strategies are reached (in the sense of a subjective elaboration of an objective process) by concrete compensations for the special interests involved through the profit-distribution process, complemented by symbolic rewards.

Comprehensive concepts of control develop in the course of capital accumulation and class struggle as they evolve over the decades. They can be defined from certain ideal-types related to the functional perspective of specific capital fractions. As indicated above, the process of class formation develops as a concrete totality through pre-existing and simultaneously reproduced cultural and political patterns. Besides representing particular functions in the circuit of capital, concepts of control therefore are also reflections in social consciousness of the circumstances in which these functions passed through a mutation in terms of these contingent, extra-economic patterns.

The historical setting may help to explain why other capitalists, or other classes, subscribe to the concept of control developed from a 'special interest' vantage-point which strictly speaking is not their own. For instance, one need not develop a cosmopolitan outlook from being engaged, as an industrial entrepreneur, in producing textiles. Yet, the fact that this industry's original prominence coincided with the heyday of international free trade makes it plausible that the textile capitalists of the day developed a set of equations in their world outlook which by and large corresponded to the liberal-internationalist ideology espoused by hegemonic commercial capital.

[scepticus]

Sounds interesting but a bit communist.

got a linky to read online?

yes, quite/very communist.

I certainly subscribe to the communist analysis of the problems with capitalism, but not to their solutions.

http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/atlanticrulingclass/

I will continue to post excerpts but by all means read it yourself - if you have a spare weekend :-)

[D.C.]

Or you could type the whole thing out

[scepticus]

Or you could type the whole thing out

cut-n-paste, seasy.

I'll do the hard work, and the lucky HPC-ers can read the precis. Everyone's a winner.

[indirectapproach]

Yeah, nice, but

.... errrrr ....

"complementarity of circulation relations"

...... errr ..... what?

[D.C.]

yes, quite/very communist.

I certainly subscribe to the communist analysis of the problems with capitalism, but not to their solutions.

http://www.theglobal...ticrulingclass/

I will continue to post excerpts but by all means read it yourself - if you have a spare weekend :-)

Never thought it, but I agree completely.

Marx is spot on about the problems with capitalism, in truth if you read Adam Smith in an earlier time he also makes reference to the problems of 'natural rent' instead of Marx's 'rentierism', you can't be a capitalist if you don't have any capital.

Marxist solutions do suck though.

That is why I'm quite interested in all this 'big society' guff. Instead of going 100% capitalist or 100% communist what happens when you throw a bit of both in the mix?

Just for fun, take an average school and look at their budget vs the service they offer.

Now figure out what they could be doing if every parent gave up 4 hours a week to do some voluntary for the school.

Are people's lives better or worse for spending 4 1/2 days a week being capitalist scum and 1/2 a day per week being saintly communists instead of zero commie & 110% capitalist?

[scepticus]

"complementarity of circulation relations"

come on, think.

debt = credit

surplus=deficit

double entry book-keeping

have I taught you nothing?

[scepticus]

That is why I'm quite interested in all this 'big society' guff. Instead of going 100% capitalist or 100% communist what happens when you throw a bit of both in the mix?

nothing, unless the dominant vested interests change.

that seems to only happen when the climate changes (see 'little ice age', circa 1320-1700) , or when large scale migratrions occur (circa 200AD). This relates to the history sampling/nyquist issue, which I'll address in a separate thread.

here are a few axioms for you:

* there is always a ruling class, with varying degree of global scope depending on the epoch

* the ruling class is always legitimised and perpetuated by the dominant popular culture (read: tolerated), otherwise it cannot survive

* when the dominant popular culture changes, so do VIs and then you get a change at the top.

* major changes in mass conciousness (for example, religion) are affected only by demographics, technology and climate.

the rest follows from there.

[indirectapproach]

"come on, think."

Who me?

If I find the language impenetrable I'm just not buying.

And just as Nelson found his safety in measures "the boldest", so I shall mark for mine (as in Twain) in the avoidance of language impenetrable.

Language should be well bred enough as to encourage thought not not so rude as to demand it, eg, "Hostilities will be engaged with our adversary on the coastal perimeter," = no no.

Edited June 4, 2010 by indirectapproach

[D.C.]

nothing, unless the dominant vested interests change.

that seems to only happen when the climate changes (see 'little ice age', circa 1320-1700) , or when large scale migratrions occur (circa 200AD). This relates to the history sampling/nyquist issue, which I'll address in a separate thread.

here are a few axioms for you:

* there is always a ruling class, with varying degree of global scope depending on the epoch

* the ruling class is always legitimised and perpetuated by the dominant popular culture (read: tolerated), otherwise it cannot survive

* when the dominant popular culture changes, so do VIs and then you get a change at the top.

* major changes in mass conciousness (for example, religion) are affected only by demographics, technology and climate.

the rest follows from there.

It's not just climate change & migration that does it. Anything that significantly changes the balance of power will do. A big war, mass starvation, death due to plague etc etc

[Injin]

come on, think.

debt = credit

surplus=deficit

double entry book-keeping

have I taught you nothing?

Nope.

[interestrateripoff]

Never thought it, but I agree completely.

Marx is spot on about the problems with capitalism, in truth if you read Adam Smith in an earlier time he also makes reference to the problems of 'natural rent' instead of Marx's 'rentierism', you can't be a capitalist if you don't have any capital.

Yep Marx had a good critique of the capitalist system, although he failed to grasp that industrial expansion was only just beginning. However to be fair at the time there was no science fiction writing as such so it was hard for people to see what advances in technology was going to bring.

[scepticus]

How about designing a law to describe the limits of imbalance that can be sustained before it creates a problem and smashes back to zero.

yes. removing the zero bound on interest rates will do that nicely.

[Injin]

yes. removing the zero bound on interest rates will do that nicely.

Why do you think anyone will just sit still and watch their money evaporate?

[scepticus]

Why do you think anyone will just sit still and watch their money evaporate?

I don't.

they will look for alternatives, which will result in negative returns in those alternatives.

there really is no escpaping negative nominal returns on money.

its called default. you should understand that.

[Injin]

I don't.

they will look for alternatives, which will result in negative returns in those alternatives.

there really is no escpaping negative nominal returns on money.

its called default. you should understand that.

Seeds and sunlight say you are wrong.

[scepticus]

Deutschebank

With this in mind, let US look at the capitals engaged in the Atlantic economy. First, Germany. German money capital was much less engaged than its counterparts in the older colonial empires in the international circuit of money capital as a separate fraction. To the extent it did, the Jewish brokers in Frankfurt dealing in American government bonds represented the oldest financial ties between the United States and Germany. Prominent among the Frankfurt money merchants were Speyer (which in 1839 also was established in New York and in the first decade of the twentieth century even developed into the temporary centre of a group of Chicago banks and Western railroad lines), Stern, and Sulzbach, Hallgarten & CO.29 The trade in precious metals, originally part of banking, gradually developed into a branch in its own right, incorporating trade in non-ferrous metals in the process. Its main centre was also the liberal Jewish merchant community of Frankfurt, and the Metalgesellschaft of the Merton family, which, with its sister firm DEGUSSA, before the First World War commanded a network of interests covering the entire North Atlantic area. On several occasions, notably following the German defeats in the two world wars, the Mertons would testify to their liberal antecedents. So, too, would (after 1945) Hermann J. Abs, a banker of Delbruck, Schickler, one of the private banks in the orbit of the Metalgesellschaft. In 1937, on account of his expertise in international money transactions, Abs was coopted into the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank.3O

A second investment bank centre with important Atlantic connections was Hamburg. Apart from the Warburg bank, mentioned already as a partner of Kuhn, Loeb, J.H. Schr\9der & Co. (like Warburg, owning an important London branch) was prominent in this respect. 31 The characteristic form of German internationalization, however, was the interlocking expansion of bank capital and technologically advanced industry. The great electricity holdings ageBosch, and Siemens - together with the Deutsche, and Dresdner Banks formed the core of this faction, which also loosely included the light chemical industry (BASE and the once-famous Scheidemandel concern). As far as the banks were "concerned, the Dresdner Bank in 1905 concluded a business agreement with Morgan. The Atlantic bond here was embodied by the Zinsser family, directors in both banks and eventually commanding, through the marriages of Zinsser daughters with Konrad Adenauer, Lewis Douglas, and John McCloy, a formidable Atlantic kin-system of its own. On the whole, however, 'German capitalist relations with Morgan, who as before remained the proven trustee of British capital in the United States. . ., remained limited and transitory'. 32

The Deutsche Bank, which from an early date was involved in oil, notably in Rumania, developed its Atlantic links mainly from a sphere-of-interest point of view. In 1913 it concluded an oil market agreement with Rockefeller. Relations with Rockefeller, if not always very successful, dated back before the turn of the century to Henry Villard, Deutsche Bank's US agent, who challenged Morgan on several occasions. 33 The sphere-of-interest relation with Rockefeller would acquire new pertinence in the state-monopoly era, when the chemical and oil trusts in their respective orbits entered into extensive cartel agreements lasting well into World War Two. Again, the thrust of German bank capital in this era was not primarily to the other side of the Atlantic; on the contrary, the biggest German private bank of the era, Meldelssohn & Co. was the chiefforeign banker of the Russian Czar, while Bleichroder, another key Berlin bank, was strong in Austria and Italy. The Cologne banks, meanwhile, were intertwined with French interests.

Germany is historically (since AD 410) the centre of european politics. Only relatively recently has german capital been suborned into the atlantic ponzi.

From where it came, it will return - i.e. russia, eastern europe, scandinavia and so on.

A split with the pigs seems inevitable.

Also it would seem from revelations the last couple of years that deutsche is europes goldman sachs. A fall approaches, perhaps, after which german capital can sever ties with NATO?

[Injin]

Deutschebank

With this in mind, let US look at the capitals engaged in the Atlantic economy. First, Germany. German money capital was much less engaged than its counterparts in the older colonial empires in the international circuit of money capital as a separate fraction. To the extent it did, the Jewish brokers in Frankfurt dealing in American government bonds represented the oldest financial ties between the United States and Germany. Prominent among the Frankfurt money merchants were Speyer (which in 1839 also was established in New York and in the first decade of the twentieth century even developed into the temporary centre of a group of Chicago banks and Western railroad lines), Stern, and Sulzbach, Hallgarten & CO.29 The trade in precious metals, originally part of banking, gradually developed into a branch in its own right, incorporating trade in non-ferrous metals in the process. Its main centre was also the liberal Jewish merchant community of Frankfurt, and the Metalgesellschaft of the Merton family, which, with its sister firm DEGUSSA, before the First World War commanded a network of interests covering the entire North Atlantic area. On several occasions, notably following the German defeats in the two world wars, the Mertons would testify to their liberal antecedents. So, too, would (after 1945) Hermann J. Abs, a banker of Delbruck, Schickler, one of the private banks in the orbit of the Metalgesellschaft. In 1937, on account of his expertise in international money transactions, Abs was coopted into the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank.3O

A second investment bank centre with important Atlantic connections was Hamburg. Apart from the Warburg bank, mentioned already as a partner of Kuhn, Loeb, J.H. Schr\9der & Co. (like Warburg, owning an important London branch) was prominent in this respect. 31 The characteristic form of German internationalization, however, was the interlocking expansion of bank capital and technologically advanced industry. The great electricity holdings ageBosch, and Siemens - together with the Deutsche, and Dresdner Banks formed the core of this faction, which also loosely included the light chemical industry (BASE and the once-famous Scheidemandel concern). As far as the banks were "concerned, the Dresdner Bank in 1905 concluded a business agreement with Morgan. The Atlantic bond here was embodied by the Zinsser family, directors in both banks and eventually commanding, through the marriages of Zinsser daughters with Konrad Adenauer, Lewis Douglas, and John McCloy, a formidable Atlantic kin-system of its own. On the whole, however, 'German capitalist relations with Morgan, who as before remained the proven trustee of British capital in the United States. . ., remained limited and transitory'. 32

The Deutsche Bank, which from an early date was involved in oil, notably in Rumania, developed its Atlantic links mainly from a sphere-of-interest point of view. In 1913 it concluded an oil market agreement with Rockefeller. Relations with Rockefeller, if not always very successful, dated back before the turn of the century to Henry Villard, Deutsche Bank's US agent, who challenged Morgan on several occasions. 33 The sphere-of-interest relation with Rockefeller would acquire new pertinence in the state-monopoly era, when the chemical and oil trusts in their respective orbits entered into extensive cartel agreements lasting well into World War Two. Again, the thrust of German bank capital in this era was not primarily to the other side of the Atlantic; on the contrary, the biggest German private bank of the era, Meldelssohn & Co. was the chiefforeign banker of the Russian Czar, while Bleichroder, another key Berlin bank, was strong in Austria and Italy. The Cologne banks, meanwhile, were intertwined with French interests.

Germany is historically (since AD 410) the centre of european politics. Only relatively recently has german capital been suborned into the atlantic ponzi.

From where it came, it will return - i.e. russia, eastern europe, scandinavia and so on.

A split with the pigs seems inevitable.

Also it would seem from revelations the last couple of years that deutsche is europes goldman sachs. A fall approaches, perhaps, after which german capital can sever ties with NATO?

That's a good trick, being the centre of poltitics hundreds of years before being invented.

You haven't asked the question (you never do) - what is capital?

Edited June 5, 2010 by Injin

[scepticus]

That's a good trick, being the centre of poltitics hundreds of years before being invented.

???

You haven't asked the question (you never do) - what is capital?

strictly speaking ,I never ask you what is capital, because I already know your answer.

[Injin]

???

You are projecting existing and previous structures backwards through history. It's a bit silly.

strictly speaking ,I never ask you what is capital, because I already know your answer.

And that's a problem all over - you think the answers to economic and social problems are subjective.

What do you think is capital?

There is only one right answer.

[scepticus]

The crystallization of a state-monopoly tendency in the Atlantic bourgeoisie during the interwar years arose from the survival needs of large-scale industry confronted with the havoc wrought by an anarchic liberal capitalism, whose operating principles were no longer adequate to the development of the productive forces.

After the Armistice in 1918, state intervention had been dismantled along with the apparatuses of the war economies as such. The defeat of the working class and the confinement of its revolution to Soviet Russia allowed the bourgeoisie to opt for a rehabilitation of pre-war patterns of class and economic relations, and to retreat from the danger-zone of state control. In their evaluation of state intervention, the liberal bourgeoisie did not doubt for a minute the accuracy of Lenin's assessment of state-monopoly capitalism as the 'threshold of socialism'.

The state-monopoly tendency in the bourgeoisie, on the contrary, estimated that capitalism could profit from a mitigation of economic liberalism and a systematic state intervention. As indicated in Chapter One, such ideas had been propounded from the late nineteenth century on by Hobson, Ford, and others, and gradually, their reasoning came to be shared by a generation of the bourgeoisie dependent on state support, cartelization, and other economic arrangements contradicting the money-capital concept and the liberal order. When laissez faire exploded in 1929 and failed to respond to orthodox liberal methods of reviving it, the productive-capital concept gravitated to a hegemonic position and the condition of capitalist society elevated the fractional interest of the state- monopoly tendency to the level of the apparently general interest. The concrete forms of its breakthrough and the political struggles accompanying them differed greatly, but everywhere in the North Atlantic area the corporatist restructuration of class relations, the 'domestication' of the circuit of money capital under state auspices, and the crystallization of sphere-of-interest arrangements in the international field unmistakably signified the triumph of the state- monopoly tendency.

Reciprocating the entrenchment of socialism in one country in the Soviet Union, Atlantic capitalism temporarily sought to consolidate itself by an experiment with Lenin's October emergency programme.

It seems clear o me we are at the start of a re-emergence of the state-monopoly tendency, which has been in remission since the 70s. Whether this is sufficient to restore some kind of equilibrium by this means alone remains to be seen.

For my part, I think not, mainly because the state monopoly tendency is so very highly indebted.

[Injin]

It seems clear o me we are at the start of a re-emergence of the state-monopoly tendency, which has been in remission since the 70s. Whether this is sufficient to restore some kind of equilibrium by this means alone remains to be seen.

For my part, I think not, mainly because the state monopoly tendency is so very highly indebted.

For the same reason I think it's not possible for the state tendency to go any further. That vein is tapped out.

State failures and subsequent restructuring, yes.

Getting larger and more dominant?

Nooo can't be afforded and they are about to let far too many people down to be trusted.