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Biriani

Why Central Banks Let Hpi Happen

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Here's a thoughtful and provocative piece by Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach, which gives his view on why central banks have allowed asset bubbles to develop, and where they might have gone wrong.

It's also a good explanation for those of you out there convinced that there is some kind of central bank conspiracy to create HPI - yes it may be their fault, but the reason for their actions is much more subtle.

http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/diges...st.html#anchor0

Some highlights, for the lazy among you :P

...By consciously ignoring the perils of a mounting asset bubble — a stunning reversal, of course, from Alan Greenspan’s original warning of “irrational exuberance” in the stock market in December 1996 — the Fed became entrapped in the dreaded multi-bubble syndrome

...the miracle drug that was used as the cure for the first bubble created a dangerous addiction — systemic risk, in financial market parlance — that has fostered a string of asset bubbles. Unfortunately, that addiction has yet to be broken.

...In the end, there must be more to monetary policy than a single-mined preoccupation with price stability ... In a low-inflation climate, monetary authorities should be especially wary of fostering excess liquidity that plays to the asymmetrical risks of asset bubbles; instead, policy should become predisposed more toward tightening than accommodation

...A recent paper by William White, head of economic research at the BIS, makes a strong case that central banks can avoid the perils of asset bubbles by allowing for greater flexibility of monetary policy in pursuit of price stability

...The US central bank has yet to develop an exit strategy from the multi-bubble syndrome that the Fed, in its zeal for inflation targeting, has spawned. Moreover, as one bubble begets another, excess asset appreciation has become a substitute for income-based saving — forcing the US to import surplus saving from abroad in order to sustain economic growth

...The multi-bubble experience of the past six years is a wake-up call for central banks. A new approach to monetary policy is urgently needed.

Edited by Biriani

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Thats a long piece - can you give us a digest version? <_<

I started to read it, but quickly realised that even if it had the key to eternal happiness and the solution to all the world's problems, there is no way I can be ar*sed reading it. :D

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I started to read it, but quickly realised that even if it had the key to eternal happiness and the solution to all the world's problems, there is no way I can be ar*sed reading it. :D

The 'actual' page is long, but contains many articles.... :rolleyes:

I worry increasingly that history will not treat the recent record of central banking kindly. Inflation may well have been conquered — a conclusion financial markets are actively debating again — but that was yesterday’s battle. Over the past six years, monetary authorities have turned the liquidity spigot wide open. This has given rise to an endless string of asset bubbles — from equities to bonds to property to risky assets (emerging markets and high-yield credit) to commodities. Central banks have ducked responsibility for this state of affairs. That could end up being a policy blunder of monumental proportions. A new approach to monetary policy is urgently needed.

Modern-day central banking was born out of the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Led by Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, monetary authorities became tough and disciplined in their efforts to break the back of a deeply entrenched inflationary mindset. Price stability became the sine qua non of macro stabilization policy. Nothing else really mattered. Without inflation, it was argued, economies could realize extraordinary efficiencies that would enhance resource allocation and maximize returns for the owners of capital and providers of labor (see, for example, Alan Greenspan’s 3 January 2004 speech, “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy”). Who could ask for more?

The subsequent disinflation was a major victory for central banking. It was also a major victory for the “monetarists” who argued that inflation was everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon (see Milton Friedman, A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis, 1971). In retrospect, central banking’s finest hour came in the early days of this struggle -- in the immediate aftermath of the wrenching monetary tightenings that were required to break the vicious circle of the inflationary spiral. Unfortunately, the authorities have been much less successful in “managing the peace” — steering post-inflation economies toward the hallowed ground of price stability. By focusing solely on the inflation battle, there is now risk of losing a much bigger war. That’s what the profusion of asset bubbles is telling us, in my view. The great triumph of central banking rings increasingly hollow in today’s bubble-prone environment.

What happened along the way? For starters, circumstances changed — in particular, circumstances that a one-dimensional monetary policy framework was ill-equipped to handle. Two developments are key in this regard — IT-enabled productivity growth and globalization. Both of these structural developments had — and continue to have — powerful disinflationary consequences. Fixated on CPI-based targeting — or some variant thereof — central banks missed the trees for the forest. Focused on formulistic linkages between policy instruments and inflation, they failed to allow for the structural pressures that reinforced an increasingly powerful disinflation.

America’s Federal Reserve was different. Under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, the Fed was quick to jump on the productivity story. But its reaction may well have sown the seeds for today’s problems. Ultimately, the Fed took the productivity story to mean that the US economy could run hotter without suffering inflationary consequences. In response, the Fed all but abandoned economic growth as an “intermediate target” in its quest for price stability — effectively ignoring a signal that normally would have led to a monetary tightening in a high-growth climate. By embracing a new approach to monetary policy, and in taking on the unaccustomed role as a “cheerleader” for the IT-enabled US economy, the Greenspan-led Fed not only stayed easier than might have otherwise been the case but also sent a powerful “buy” signal to equity market participants.

The rest is history — and a potentially painful one at that. By consciously ignoring the perils of a mounting asset bubble — a stunning reversal, of course, from Alan Greenspan’s original warning of “irrational exuberance” in the stock market in December 1996 — the Fed became entrapped in the dreaded multi-bubble syndrome. Stressing that it had learned the lessons of Japan, the US central bank was aggressive in easing in the aftermath of the bursting of the equity bubble. A new Governor by the name of Ben Bernanke led the charge at the time in arguing that the US central bank should use every means possible to avoid an unwelcome post-bubble deflation — including, if necessary, “unconventional” measures aimed at targeting the yield curve, providing subsidized bank credit, and even pegging the dollar (see his 21 November 2002 speech, “Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here”). With inflation low — and the risk of deflation actually rising at the time — the price-targeting Fed had no compunction about turning the liquidity spigot wide open. And so the miracle drug that was used as the cure for the first bubble created a dangerous addiction — systemic risk, in financial market parlance — that has fostered a string of asset bubbles. Unfortunately, that addiction has yet to be broken.

What can be done? In technical terms, the problem boils down to one of coping with asymmetrical risks at low nominal interest rates. The inference here is that the policy rule of the inflation targeter may need to become increasingly flexible as an economy approaches price stability. When inflation is low and a price-targeting central bank pushes nominal interest rates down to unusually low levels, there are new risks to confront — namely, asset bubbles. Central banks that let economies “rip” because inflation risks are minimal, are asking for trouble. That doesn’t mean monetary authorities should target asset prices. It does mean, however, that there are times when asset markets need to be taken into consideration in the setting of monetary policy. A low nominal interest rate regime is precisely one of those times.

This is heady stuff in policy circles. It implies that the Fed should have started leaning against the equity bubble in the late 1990s — precisely the intent of Alan Greenspan’s initial concern over irrational exuberance. The same may well be the case today when central banks are faced with the inflationary headwinds imparted by globalization. In the end, there must be more to monetary policy than a single-mined preoccupation with price stability. Once “zero inflation” is close at hand, the monetary authority needs to become more nimble and broaden out its goals. In a low-inflation climate, monetary authorities should be especially wary of fostering excess liquidity that plays to the asymmetrical risks of asset bubbles; instead, policy should become predisposed more toward tightening than accommodation.

This is where the debate currently rages in central banking circles. Obviously, the Bank of Japan has learned the most painful lesson of all. The Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of Australia have both tightened in response to emerging property bubbles. Otmar Issing of the European Central Bank has argued that developments in asset markets may well present modern-day central banking with its greatest challenge (see Issing’s op-ed essay in the 18 February 2004 Wall Street Journal, “Money and Credit”). But it is the Bank for International Settlements — the bank for central banks — that has really taken intellectual leadership in this debate. A recent paper by William White, head of economic research at the BIS, makes a strong case that central banks can avoid the perils of asset bubbles by allowing for greater flexibility of monetary policy in pursuit of price stability (see “Is Price Stability Enough?” BIS Working Paper No. 205, April 2006). Other BIS researchers have recently stressed the unusual restraint that globalization has imparted to inflation (see Claudio Borio and Andrew Filardo, “Globalisation and Inflation: New Cross-Country Evidence on the Global Determinants of Domestic Inflation,” March 2006). In their view, if monetary policy ignores the new structural forces constraining inflation, there is a risk of “undesirable side effects, such as … the build-up of financial imbalances, notably excessive credit and asset price increases that could raise material risks for the economy further down the road.”

By contrast, America’s Federal Reserve is increasingly isolated in arguing that asset markets should be ignored in the setting of monetary policy. In fact, its new chairman is the academic high priest of inflation targeting — embracing an even tighter rules-based approach than his predecessor. Asset bubbles are, at best, an after-thought in a strict inflation-targeting regime. Therein lies the potential for a strategic policy blunder: The US central bank has yet to develop an exit strategy from the multi-bubble syndrome that the Fed, in its zeal for inflation targeting, has spawned. Moreover, as one bubble begets another, excess asset appreciation has become a substitute for income-based saving — forcing the US to import surplus saving from abroad in order to sustain economic growth. And, of course, the only way America can attract that capital is by running a massive current-account deficit. In other words, not only has the Fed’s approach given rise to a seemingly endless string of asset bubbles, but it has also played a major role in fostering global imbalances.

Central banks deserve great credit for waging a successful battle against inflation. To their credit, this war is never over — monetary authorities must always remain alert to the possibilities of a resurgence of inflation. But policy strategies have been surprisingly unprepared to cope with the pitfalls that emerge as economies near the hallowed ground of price stability. Nor have inflation-targeting monetary authorities shown themselves to be adaptable to changing circumstances, such as IT-enabled productivity enhancement and globalization. To the extent rules-bound central banks operate in a vacuum and fail to appreciate the impact of these powerful structural headwinds, they may be biased toward injecting too much liquidity into the system. The multi-bubble experience of the past six years is a wake-up call for central banks. A new approach to monetary policy is urgently needed.

A snippet.

Edited by Come On Down

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u call that a snippet?!

how about a synopsis of the 'snippet'? B)

Basically it's saying that central banks are getting it wrong because they're fighting yesterday's battle. They did well in the seventies and eighties by going back to monetary basics and targetting inflation - inflation was thus "conquered" for the time being, and central banks have continued to focus on CPI.

However now we have globalisation, the IT economy and reduced inflation expectations, there are broad factors that combine to keep CPI low. As a result the banks have allowed the liquidity taps to stay on to stimulate growth, in spite of warning signs such as multiple asset bubble. They don't target assets, just inflation vs growth. So even though Greenspan was in early (in 96) warning of exuberance in the markets, they didn't act, preferring to cheerlead for the US economy and growth (it's a US-based article).

As a result there are now asset bubbles and in order to deal with the increased inflation threat banks need to increase IRs, but there is a danger of this choking off growth. So they are in a bit of a double bind that could lead to stagflation (stagnant growth combined with inflation).

Thanks for posting it Biriani - it is an excellent conspiracy-free expanation of what banks are doing wrong. The only thing I think it omits is the importance of 9/11, because I think that occurred at a moment when Greenspan might otherwise have been able to adapt his approach and allow some cooling off. But it was so important to avoid a terrorist-caused recession, banks both sides of the Atlantic chose to stimulate growth rather than worry about asset bubbles. I see that as a major factor in the current situation.

Edited by Magpie

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Basically it's saying that central banks getting it wrong because are fighting yesterday's battle. They did well in the seventies and eighties by going back to monetary basics and targetting inflation - inflation was thus "conquered" for the time being, and central banks have continued to focus on CPI.

However now we have globalisation, the IT economy and reduced inflation expectations, there are broad factors that combine to keep CPI low. As a result the banks have allowed the liquidity taps to stay on to stimulate growth, in spite of warning signs such as multiple asset bubble. They don't target assets, just inflation vs growth. So even though Greenspan was in early (in 96) warning of exuberance in the markets, they didn't act, preferring to cheerlead for the US economy and growth (it's a US-based article).

As a result there are now asset bubbles and in order to deal with the increased inflation threat banks need to increase IRs, but there is a danger of this choking off growth. So they are in a bit of a double bind that could lead to stagflation (stagnant growth combined with inflation).

Thanks for posting it Biriani - it is an excellent conspiracy-free expanation of what banks are doing wrong. The only thing I think it omits is the importance of 9/11, because I think that occurred at a moment when Greenspan might otherwise have been able to adapt his approach and allow some cooling off. But it was so important to avoid a terrorist-caused recession, banks both sides of the Atlantic chose to stimulate growth rather than worry about asset bubbles. I see that as a major factor in the current situation.

cut to the chase - what's the next bubble gonna be??

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I didn't understand this bit in his article, and think it is wrong w.r.t. UK:

The Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of Australia have both tightened in response to emerging property bubbles.

Surely the problem of asset bubbles (which increase the cost of living) could be solved by incorporating them in a real measure of inflation. You know, get some more negative feedback into the IR control system.

What am I missing here?

JY

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cut to the chase - what's the next bubble gonna be??

Don't ask me - try the all-knowing Dr Bubb or one of our other resident gurus.

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cut to the chase - what's the next bubble gonna be??

Goodness, you people really are impatient! :lol:

If I interpret it right, Roach's take on it is that there isn't another obvious asset class to go to. Of course, it could just be that nobody has spotted it yet, but maybe this is actually is the end of the line.

Mind you, it might just be that he does have a view on the next big thing, and just isn't telling anyone. Would you?

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I didn't understand this bit in his article, and think it is wrong w.r.t. UK:

Surely the problem of asset bubbles (which increase the cost of living) could be solved by incorporating them in a real measure of inflation. You know, get some more negative feedback into the IR control system.

What am I missing here?

JY

Two things:

Firstly it would be tricky to incorporate asset prices rises into standard inflation measurements, because they are too volatile and not really part of what the banks are monitoring with respect to the inflation/growth conundrum. However it would make a lot of sense for banks to pay greater regard to asset bubbles as part of their wider examination of the economy. However...

Secondly the whole point is that banks did fairly well for an extended period by using the model that ignores asset bubbles - in that respect they were fighting yesterday's battles. They are starting to worry about them now, but it's a bit late as the problems are already there. A really wise central banker might have reacted a lot sooner to the build up of asset bubbles but they were scared to step out of line and bring in deflationary policies that might harm growth (politically unpopular) and then we had the aftermath of 9/11 as an additional disincentive.

PS - I think in referring to the BOE tightening he is assuming that the rate hike the markets are expecting will happen. Either that or he's an insular American who doesn't really care much enough the UK to check his facts...

Edited by Magpie

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That sounded rather bitchy!

Maybe a touch... <_< But even so he'd be a better person to ask than me.

I suspect Biriani's right though. There are so many bubbles around that there's not much scope for the "next big thing". I suppose gold might have some way to run, but it could be a rollercoaster ride.

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Two things:

Firstly it would be tricky to incorporate asset prices rises into standard inflation measurements, because they are too volatile and not really part of what the banks are monitoring with respect to the inflation/growth conundrum. However it would make a lot of sense for banks to pay greater regard to asset bubbles as part of their wider examination of the economy. However...

Secondly the whole point is that banks did fairly well for an extended period by using the model that ignores asset bubbles - in that respect they were fighting yesterday's battles. They are starting to worry about them now, but it's a bit late as the problems are already there. A really wise central banker might have reacted a lot sooner to the build up of asset bubbles but they were scared to step out of line and bring in deflationary policies that might harm growth (politically unpopular) and then we had the aftermath of 9/11 as an additional disincentive.

Yes, got that.

The problem is this: the central bankers do not monitor and respond to true inflation - in fact they often remove anything that goes up in price e.g. cost of housing, taxes.

If they did monitor and respond to true inflation, IR's would be adjusted more quickly and bubbles would not be allowed to form (in any asset class that affects the cost of living e.g. HP).

It's as if they have a warning-light in the control room that's not actually connected to the reactor core. A la Chernobyl...

JY

Edited by JustYield

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Thanks for posting it Biriani - it is an excellent conspiracy-free expanation of what banks are doing wrong. The only thing I think it omits is the importance of 9/11, because I think that occurred at a moment when Greenspan might otherwise have been able to adapt his approach and allow some cooling off. But it was so important to avoid a terrorist-caused recession, banks both sides of the Atlantic chose to stimulate growth rather than worry about asset bubbles. I see that as a major factor in the current situation.

GW-Bush boomed his own people on the 9/11 so he could make a rush for the oil, it’s as simple as that unless you want to go into business of melting 6” steel plate by simply poring kerosene on it and watching it melt.

It was a conspiracy about taking drugs and selling them to Americans to finance a war, Oliver North proved otherwise and yet all the politicians still managed to get away with it so it’s not hard to understand why GW-Bush believed he could pull off another pearl harbour and get away with it.

Can you see a airoplane

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Yes, got that.

The problem is this: the central bankers do not monitor and respond to true inflation - in fact they often remove anything that goes up in price e.g. cost of housing, taxes.

Yes, well that's where a touch of conspiracy theory might be in order.

My feeling is that post-9/11 the banks felt political pressure to stimulate growth (and govts interfered a bit more to downgrade inflation measurements to assist them in this) - so rather than actually targetting inflation in a rigorous way, they got into the habit of targetting perceived inflation. Fine for a year or so but as an ongoing habit pretty dangerous - so as well as fighting yesterday's battles they are also doing it in a less rigorous way.

That's where worrying about asset bubbles a bit sooner might have given them a dose of reality.

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The only thing I think it omits is the importance of 9/11,... [Magpie]

While it was politically important, outside of the airline industry and those businesses directly affected, it had no great economic significance -- Hurricane Katrina caused far more damage.

...what's the next bubble gonna be?? [WSG]

Interest rates?

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GW-Bush boomed his own people on the 9/11 so he could make a rush for the oil, it’s as simple as that ...so it’s not hard to understand why GW-Bush believed he could pull off another pearl harbour and get away with it.

I have some sympathy with this viewpoint too. But regardless of what the true story behind it was, I think we have to ackowledge that 9/11 did a lot to unbalance central banking both here and in the US.

The only thing I think it omits is the importance of 9/11,... [Magpie]

While it was politically important, outside of the airline industry and those businesses directly affected, it had no great economic significance -- Hurricane Katrina caused far more damage.

Yes, but both the US and UK economies were looking like they would go into a recessionary period or at least a period of reduced growth, and both already had some asset bubbles. The US and UK governments were very keen to avoid the idea that their economies had been affected by 9/11, so in both cases they loosened monetary control, kept interest rates low or lowered them, and stimulated growth at exactly the moment of the economic cycle when this was probably unwise.

It's not the direct economic effects - it's what it did to monetary policy that mattered.

Edited by Magpie

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The US and UK governments were very keen to avoid the idea that their economies had been affected by 9/11, so in both cases they loosened monetary control, kept interest rates low or lowered them, and stimulated growth at exactly the moment of the economic cycle when this was probably unwise.

Quite. With hindsight it's easy to criticise, but I think at the time it was the right decision to loosen policy and prevent the risk of financial meltdown in the wake of 9/11.

The trouble was that the economy didn't recover quickly enough, and central bankers weren't brave enough, to raise rates again when it became clear that meltdown had been averted. Instead, rates were kept low because consumers had become addicted to cheap credit and taking it away would inevitably cause pain which policymakers were reluctant to inflict.

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Yes, but both the US and UK economies were looking like they would go into a recessionary period or at least a period of reduced growth, and both already had some asset bubbles. [Magpie]

That was due to the collapse of the Dot com bubble -- then the biggest asset bubble in history.

The US and UK governments were very keen to avoid the idea that their economies had been affected by 9/11, so in both cases they loosened monetary control, kept interest rates low or lowered them, and stimulated growth at exactly the moment of the economic cycle when this was probably unwise.

Monetary policy remained under the control of the Central Banks throughout. UK interest rates were reduced steadily throughout 2001, remained unchanged in 2002, and were only reduced to the historic low of 3.5% in July 2003 -- almost 2 years after 9/11. Then as now their objective was to target inflation. It's possible that the lower airfares resulting from 9/11 may have helped reduce inflation by enough to enable interest rates to be cut by the odd quarter point, but that's about it.

'UK Interest Rates':

http://www.houseweb.co.uk/house/market/irfig.html

It's not the direct economic effects - it's what it did to monetary policy that mattered.

Not much.

Edited by Jeff Ross

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GW-Bush boomed his own people on the 9/11 so he could make a rush for the oil, it’s as simple as that unless you want to go into business of melting 6” steel plate by simply poring kerosene on it and watching it melt.

It was a conspiracy about taking drugs and selling them to Americans to finance a war, Oliver North proved otherwise and yet all the politicians still managed to get away with it so it’s not hard to understand why GW-Bush believed he could pull off another pearl harbour and get away with it.

Can you see a airoplane

Well I blame the Freemasons.

They have a vested interest in constuction, which is ample motive for the destruction of 2 great buildings (in addition to the invasion of Afganistan, the murder of thousands, causing a recession and tripling the price of a barrell of oil).

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That was due to the collapse of the Dot com bubble -- then the biggest asset bubble in history.

Yes, so that created the fear that a recession was on the horizon.

Monetary policy remained under the control of the Central Banks throughout. UK interest rates were reduced steadily throughout 2001

Central Banks are not exactly immune to political pressure and they don't act in ignorance of the wider implications of their actions.

The rates were already falling, but the three months after 9/11 saw three successive IR falls, 1% in total - a pretty rapid fall, directly in response to the attack, directly intended to bolster growth.

Not much.

I refer you to my previous answer :P

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The rates were already falling, but the three months after 9/11 saw three successive IR falls, 1% in total - a pretty rapid fall, directly in response to the attack, directly intended to bolster growth. [Magpie]

Rates were also reduced by 1% earlier in 2001. While 9/11 may have brought forward one or possibly two rate reductions by a few months -- rates were left unchanged throughout 2002 -- it's fanciful to say that all three reductions in late 2001 were "directly in response to the attack". They would have happened anyway -- as the further reductions in 2003 confirm.

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it's fanciful to say that all three reductions in late 2001 were "directly in response to the attack". They would have happened anyway -- as the further reductions in 2003 confirm.

Well I don't agree that three consecutive cuts in the three months after 9/11, that took rates to historic lows, were sheer coincidence. Rates had already come down a fair way and the natural next step in normal circumstances would have been greater caution.

If I can work out how to I'll look up the MPC minutes and contemporary press reports, but I seem to remember it being reported as cuts to stimulate the economy in a dangerous time.

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Hi,

It does confirm yet again the links and articles I have been posting for nearly a year about the accidental discovery, in the anglo-saxon economies particularly - of a private sector keynesianism, 70's style demand management using private citizen debt as the channel with house prices as the catalyst. A DELIBERATE policy used for economic and poltical means by the chancellor. Our government has no clue where it's going, how it will end, life after HPI funded consumption....... The long and short of it is that it is not a neatly orchestrated, planned monetary policy by the treasury, they are making it up as they go along. It is not a new paradigm, a solution to boom and bust as we would be lead to believe. Many of the artciles that emerged in the recent past, on this subject, have originated from the academic circles, Warwick and Cambridge Universities in particular have produced excellent articles. Seems at last the commercial world may be waking up to the dangers of a rudderless ship out on the open ocean.

Boomer

Edited by boom_and_bust

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