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bear_or_bull
QUOTE (sossij @ Mar 6 2008, 03:25 PM) *
Indeed. This man knew a thing or two about leverage - they used simple box-cutters to implement the attacks on the WTC which in turn set in motion the eventual destruction of the highly leveraged financial system of the west. From a 50 cent box-cutter to the $trillion global markets. Clever.

Then again, remember the 44th rule of acquistion (see sig.)



Assymetric financial conflict.
Only a GENIUS could come up with that.

sossij
QUOTE (drminky @ Mar 6 2008, 03:46 PM) *
well, possibly. Perhaps more luck than wisdom. It was the collapse of the tech bubble and the financial crises of 1998 which started the wheels in motion for the great unwinding.. and do you really think that without 911 the republicans WOULDN'T have found someone to make war with after 8 years in office? ph34r.gif


Agreed. The stone was already in motion and gathering moss before the WTC attacks. OBL just gave it a nudge.
cgnao
This is the mark of the derivative beast.

Protect yourselves NOW.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=bond
Agency Mortgage Bonds Spreads Rise; Markets `Utterly Unhinged'

March 6 (Bloomberg) -- The extra yield investors demand to own agency mortgage-backed securities widened for a sixth straight day, staying at 22-year highs, as banks stepped up margin calls to funds and concerns grew that the Federal Reserve may be unable to prevent the credit slump from deepening.

The difference in yields, or spread, on the Bloomberg index for Fannie Mae's current-coupon, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage bonds and 10-year government notes widened about 6 basis points, to 222 basis points, the highest since 1986 and 88 basis points higher than Jan. 15. The spread helps determine the interest rate homeowners pay on new prime mortgages of $417,000 or less. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

The markets became ``utterly unhinged'' yesterday, William O'Donnell, a U.S. government bond strategist in Stamford, Connecticut, at UBS, wrote in a note to clients. A lack of liquidity ``led to stunning air-pockets in price levels,'' O'Donnell said.

The widening spreads prompted speculation the government may step in to support mortgage-backed debt guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, said Tom di Galoma, head of U.S. Treasury trading in New York at Jefferies & Co., a brokerage for institutional investors. The U.S. Treasury said the rumor isn't true.

``The Fed can't really save the mortgage market,'' di Galoma said. ``As they keep cutting, mortgage rates aren't going lower.''

Carlyle Margin Call

Carlyle Group's publicly traded mortgage bond fund, which raised $300 million in July and used loans to buy about $22 billion of agency mortgage securities, failed to meet margin calls and said today it received a notice of default. In margin calls, banks demand borrowers put up more collateral against their loans.

Carlyle Capital Corp. missed four of seven margin calls yesterday totaling more than $37 million, the Guernsey, U.K.- based fund said today in a statement.

Outstanding agency mortgage securities -- which are guaranteed by government-chartered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or federal agency Ginnie Mae -- total almost $4.5 trillion, about the same size as the U.S. Treasury market. Bloomberg current- coupon indexes represent the average of yields for the two groups of bonds with prices just above and below face value, the ones that lenders typically package new loans into.
Shedfish
Hank Paulson is a genius - he said "it's contained"...

http://www.bloomberg.com/

* Stocks in U.S. Drop, Led by Banks on Home Foreclosures, Recession Concern

* U.S. Mortgage Foreclosures Increase to All-Time High as Owners `Give Up'

* Carlyle Mortgage-Bond Fund Gets Default Notice After Missing Margin Calls

* Trichet Dashes Rate-Cut Speculation, Sending Euro to Record Against Dollar

* Euro-Rate Surge Overwhelming Fed Easing as 3-Month Libor Hits 7-Week High

* Credit Default Swaps Overwhelm Bernanke Ease as Corporate Debt Costs Surge
Noel
QUOTE (hotairmail @ Mar 6 2008, 10:17 AM) *
Yes. More exactly, a company cannot have a more than 100% chance of going bust. And if you could, I'm sure CGNAO would inflate expectations to "110% guaranteed" for instance....which may be true of these guys....

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home

Carlyle Capital going down.


I can't see where in the article it talks about more than 100% chance of the company going bust??
mdman
The >100% probability quote was from here

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home

And the bond markets are 'utterly unhinged' as described here

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=new...id=a0ImZ0ifl.0A

They really are gloomy mofos at Bloomberg


Noel
QUOTE (algorithmbetting @ Mar 6 2008, 11:35 AM) *
from my limited knowledge i believe correlation can so often be a red herring. a correlation of +1 only proves 2 sets of data are perfectly correlated in the period assessed. it does not show one moves the other or vice versa and it does not prove the relationship will be the same tomorrow. a racing driver shows speed is not correlated to death until he dies.

searching for correlation i believe is only useful if it gets you closer to understanding relationships. a relationship in itself is worth nothing.

hence these derivative models worked under the 'old world' model but they may not have allowed for illiquidity. someone will now develop a model including liquidity as a variable. but then whats next?

as i said before if you add in all possible variables i think the models would show no long term profits are available


Looking at the article again it would appear that the CDOs are CDS (rather than MBS or other) - as far as I am aware there are no liquidity problems in these markets - certainly not in European single name/indices.

You can get some genuine arbitrage opportunities -

http://www.noelwatson.com/blog/PermaLink,g...e0236f1e5a.aspx

although sometimes there may not be liquidity in the underlying CDS


Noel
QUOTE (mdman @ Mar 6 2008, 05:39 PM) *
The >100% probability quote was from here

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home

And the bond markets are 'utterly unhinged' as described here

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=new...id=a0ImZ0ifl.0A

They really are gloomy mofos at Bloomberg


"Last month some showed the odds of a default by an investment-grade company spreading to others exceeded 100 percent -- a mathematical impossibility, according to UBS AG"

The article was talking about correlation being greather than 100%. In the mode they use (if it is Gaussian), they plug in a correlation number between 0 and 1. Because it doesn't accurately reflect the credit market (fat tails), incorrect numbers are being returned
mdman
QUOTE (Noel @ Mar 6 2008, 05:46 PM) *
"Last month some showed the odds of a default by an investment-grade company spreading to others exceeded 100 percent -- a mathematical impossibility, according to UBS AG"

The article was talking about correlation being greather than 100%. In the mode they use (if it is Gaussian), they plug in a correlation number between 0 and 1. Because it doesn't accurately reflect the credit market (fat tails), incorrect numbers are being returned


So they're using a correlation model to estimate probability of default? They use the term "odds of default" in relation to the >100% (not correlation) which to me means probability of default.

"Last month some showed the odds of a default by an investment- grade company spreading to others exceeded 100 percent -- a mathematical impossibility, according to UBS AG"

The fact it could return a probability of default > 100% in ANY scenario means it's a useless model.

The General
QUOTE (The General @ Mar 6 2008, 12:18 PM) *
Following the recent logic applied to the Gold thread, shouldn't this thread be moved to the Financial Markets area? Credit Derivatives is a bit specialist to be amongst the house prices up, house prices down threads.

My 2 pence worth


bump
theblacksheeple
Losses Mount. Read the following carefully, 90% of loans that require securitisation as a key factor in their origination to be made by Q3 2008. What happens after Q3 2008?

This is the mark of the destruction of fractional reserve banking as we know it.


March 6 (Bloomberg) -- Citigroup Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. home lender by new loan volume, plans to pare its U.S. residential unit's mortgage and home-equity holdings by about $45 billion, or 20 percent, over the next year.

The Citigroup division will decrease its total holdings mainly by making fewer loans that can't be sold, CitiMortgage Inc. President Bill Beckmann said in a telephone interview today. The assets will drop as existing loans are repaid, he said.

``We will look for opportunistic sales, but we're not counting on that, considering current market conditions,'' Beckmann said. Citigroup plans to be selling about 90 percent of the home loans that the company makes through his unit by the third quarter, up from 65 percent last year, according to a statement today.

The New York-based bank's plan will further cut financing available to U.S. borrowers, as investors flee even government- guaranteed mortgage bonds. Lenders including Wells Fargo & Co. and Countrywide Financial Corp. have already restrained direct home lending, depressing prices for mortgage securities and making it more costly for consumers to obtain loans.

``For a long time there was a lot of cash sloshing around the markets, and that cash has dissipated,'' Darcy Morrison, who analyzes asset-backed securities at Wachovia Corp.'s Tattersall Advisory Group, said in an interview today. ``Banks aren't writing mortgages faster than they can breathe anymore.''

Pandit's Push

Citigroup's move reflects Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit's push to commit the company's balance sheet only to assets producing higher returns, Beckmann said in the interview. Pressure on the company's capital ratios from the credit market contraction are speeding a reduction in mortgage holdings that would have occurred eventually anyway, he said.

The largest U.S. bank by assets posted a record loss of $9.8 billion in the fourth quarter. It raised $7.5 billion in November from Abu Dhabi and said in January it was getting another $14.5 billion from investors including the governments of Singapore and Kuwait. The company will probably report a loss again in the first quarter, according to analysts at Merrill Lynch & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Citigroup today also said it will save $200 million within 12 months as a result of the merger of its various U.S. mortgage businesses. The combination was announced in January. Beckmann declined to say how many jobs would be cut.

To contact the reporter on this story: Jody Shenn in New York at jshenn@bloomberg.net.


cgnao
What makes them think that just one may collapse?

It will soon be too late to protect yourselves.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home
Corporate Bond Risk Soars as Concerns of Bank Failures Grow

By Shannon D. Harrington

March 6 (Bloomberg) -- The cost to protect corporate bonds from default soared to a record as hedge fund failures and rising bank funding costs stoked concern that a financial institution may collapse.

Credit-default swaps tied to Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wachovia Corp., the nation's four biggest banks, climbed to the highest on record. Benchmark gauges of credit risk in the U.S., Europe and Asia also set records. Contracts on CIT Group Inc., the largest independent commercial finance company in the U.S., approached distressed levels.

``There's so much concern about a market failure,'' said Gregory Peters, head of credit strategy at Morgan Stanley in New York. ``It's a situation where there's just a general lack of trust, and there's a heightened fear of the unknown.''
SurgeonGeneral
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 6 2008, 10:17 PM) *
What makes them think that just one may collapse?

It will soon be too late to protect yourselves.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home
Corporate Bond Risk Soars as Concerns of Bank Failures Grow

By Shannon D. Harrington

March 6 (Bloomberg) -- The cost to protect corporate bonds from default soared to a record as hedge fund failures and rising bank funding costs stoked concern that a financial institution may collapse.

Credit-default swaps tied to Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wachovia Corp., the nation's four biggest banks, climbed to the highest on record. Benchmark gauges of credit risk in the U.S., Europe and Asia also set records. Contracts on CIT Group Inc., the largest independent commercial finance company in the U.S., approached distressed levels.

``There's so much concern about a market failure,'' said Gregory Peters, head of credit strategy at Morgan Stanley in New York. ``It's a situation where there's just a general lack of trust, and there's a heightened fear of the unknown.''


When one goes they all go.
You were right CG, thanks.
Spill your guts about the call,come on.
SurgeonGeneral
Or post a link to a page where someone else has posted the same information wink.gif wink.gif
vicmac64
QUOTE (SurgeonGeneral @ Mar 6 2008, 10:33 PM) *
When one goes they all go.
You were right CG, thanks.
Spill your guts about the call,come on.

CGNAO has been right all along - its common sense really, our financial institutions are in reality based on a fraudulent system. We make nothing and export noting of any worth any more, we consume more than we export, we allow unbridled immigration, we allow our civil service to grow to the extent that it now dictates democracy due to its overhwelming size as a percentage of the population in general ( remember that it only take s one parent in eachhousehold to be employed by the govt to ensure that every adult in that household will most likely vote agaisnt any shrinking of that most burdensome bureaucratic weight on the nations resources, we have red tape coming out of our ears - QUITE FRANKLY WE ARE NOW READY FOR THE PLANNED COUP DE GRACE BY OUR UNDEMOCRATIC NWO MASTERS.

Think I'm talking nonsence - then think about Gordo the NWO puppets next plan - IDNETITY CARDS FOR EVERYONE

Its time we faced up to facts - we have lost our freedom and our country - the wasters have indeed won!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

theblacksheeple
Watch Citi Group

TBS
Crashman Begins
Do you expect these to go down heavily 7/03 ?
CONDEX
QUOTE (theblacksheeple @ Mar 6 2008, 11:33 PM) *
Watch Citi Group

TBS


Currently at $21.17
Will buy in at some point, think they're worth a point...
expatowner
QUOTE (hotairmail @ Mar 7 2008, 06:28 AM) *

appears to be a pimple on the face of someone drinking small beer
Noel
QUOTE (mdman @ Mar 6 2008, 06:09 PM) *
So they're using a correlation model to estimate probability of default? They use the term "odds of default" in relation to the >100% (not correlation) which to me means probability of default.

"Last month some showed the odds of a default by an investment- grade company spreading to others exceeded 100 percent -- a mathematical impossibility, according to UBS AG"

The fact it could return a probability of default > 100% in ANY scenario means it's a useless model.


What they are saying is that the correlation between one company defaulting and another is greater than 100%, not that probability of default >100%
Noel
QUOTE (Noel @ Mar 7 2008, 07:15 AM) *
What they are saying is that the correlation between one company defaulting and another is greater than 100%, not that probability of default >100%


Current model shortcomings being discussed on Wilmott

http://www.wilmott.com/messageview.cfm?cat...;threadid=59608
cgnao
Be aware that this is is far, far from over.

This is all you need to know and is 100% correct, guaranteed.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/af1e1c18-ee04-11dc...00779fd2ac.html

Credit derivatives turmoil strikes

By Robert Cookson and Joanna Chung in London and Michael Mackenzie in New York

Published: March 9 2008 18:42 | Last updated: March 9 2008 18:42

Turmoil in the credit derivatives markets is having an increasingly brutal impact on the wider financial system as a vicious cycle of forced selling drives risk premiums on company debt to new highs.

...

Institutions that lapped up credit risk products in recent years – many financing their purchases through borrowing – are scrambling to reduce their exposure following heavy losses, traders say.

But many investors fear conditions could worsen as hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions come under pressure to cut their losses before conditions deteriorate further.

Liquidating structured credit instruments requires buying large amounts of protection using credit default swaps. This, in turn, drives the cost of protection higher, potentially triggering a chain reaction.

“There is potential for some wild and possibly inexplicable price movements as the unwinds get bigger,” said Mehernosh Engineer, credit strategist at BNP.

The markets are so illiquid that a few trades can lead to sharp movements, producing violent price swings and knock-on effects.

Tim Bond, head of global asset allocation at Barclays Capital, said: “It’s inflicting heavy losses on the banking system, eroding their capital and reducing their ability to lend. The spread widening is so severe, you’re seeing a rise in borrowing rates across the board for everybody except top-quality governments. It’s affecting both the price and availability of credit.”

EDIT typo
Fishfinger
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 10 2008, 08:23 PM) *
Be aware that this is is far, far from over.

This is all you need to know and is 100% correct, guaranteed.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/af1e1c18-ee04-11dc...00779fd2ac.html

Credit derivatives turmoil strikes

By Robert Cookson and Joanna Chung in London and Michael Mackenzie in New York

Published: March 9 2008 18:42 | Last updated: March 9 2008 18:42

Turmoil in the credit derivatives markets is having an increasingly brutal impact on the wider financial system as a vicious cycle of forced selling drives risk premiums on company debt to new highs.

...

Institutions that lapped up credit risk products in recent years – many financing their purchases through borrowing – are scrambling to reduce their exposure following heavy losses, traders say.

But many investors fear conditions could worsen as hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions come under pressure to cut their losses before conditions deteriorate further.

Liquidating structured credit instruments requires buying large amounts of protection using credit default swaps. This, in turn, drives the cost of protection higher, potentially triggering a chain reaction.

"There is potential for some wild and possibly inexplicable price movements as the unwinds get bigger," said Mehernosh Engineer, credit strategist at BNP.

The markets are so illiquid that a few trades can lead to sharp movements, producing violent price swings and knock-on effects.

Tim Bond, head of global asset allocation at Barclays Capital, said: "It's inflicting heavy losses on the banking system, eroding their capital and reducing their ability to lend. The spread widening is so severe, you're seeing a rise in borrowing rates across the board for everybody except top-quality governments. It's affecting both the price and availability of credit."

EDIT typo


THat is not a real name surely?

More food for the derivatives monster...
jonpo
QUOTE (Noel @ Mar 7 2008, 11:31 AM) *
Current model shortcomings being discussed on Wilmott

http://www.wilmott.com/messageview.cfm?cat...;threadid=59608


Was this the "PAUL" I wonder ?
"The only solution I can think of which solves this riddle and gives you greeks is...not to trade these instruments! "

I have a signed copy of Nassim Nichloas Talebs' 'The black swan' he can read. its an excellent book for pricing instruments like these!
Assurbanipal
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 10 2008, 09:23 PM) *
Be aware that this is is far, far from over.

This is all you need to know and is 100% correct, guaranteed.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/af1e1c18-ee04-11dc...00779fd2ac.html


I think is just a begin...
tbatst2000
QUOTE (Fishfinger @ Mar 10 2008, 08:27 PM) *
THat is not a real name surely?

More food for the derivatives monster...

Yes, it's real - it's not an uncommon name in India either. There was a top-notch cricketer called Farouk Engineer IIRC.
Moo
QUOTE (tbatst2000 @ Mar 10 2008, 08:40 PM) *
There was a top-notch cricketer called Farouk Engineer IIRC.

You do, indeed, remember correctly. He even played a few tests in the same Indian team as Nari Contractor.

(Sorry for the horribly OT)
tbatst2000
QUOTE (Noel @ Mar 7 2008, 11:31 AM) *
Current model shortcomings being discussed on Wilmott

http://www.wilmott.com/messageview.cfm?cat...;threadid=59608

I find the Wilmott forums eternally frustrating - the posts are either useful and detailed but about commonly known and documented stuff or cryptic and pointless due to commercial confidentiality. There's definitely some interesting game theory analysis to be done there, but not much interesting to be read on the subject of how different people are actually pricing real instruments outside of the real vanilla stuff.
Fishfinger
QUOTE (tbatst2000 @ Mar 10 2008, 08:40 PM) *
Yes, it's real - it's not an uncommon name in India either. There was a top-notch cricketer called Farouk Engineer IIRC.


Thanks, we live and learn tongue.gif
tinecu
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 10 2008, 08:23 PM) *
Be aware that this is is far, far from over.

This is all you need to know and is 100% correct, guaranteed.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/af1e1c18-ee04-11dc...00779fd2ac.html

Credit derivatives turmoil strikes

By Robert Cookson and Joanna Chung in London and Michael Mackenzie in New York

Published: March 9 2008 18:42 | Last updated: March 9 2008 18:42

Turmoil in the credit derivatives markets is having an increasingly brutal impact on the wider financial system as a vicious cycle of forced selling drives risk premiums on company debt to new highs.

...

Institutions that lapped up credit risk products in recent years – many financing their purchases through borrowing – are scrambling to reduce their exposure following heavy losses, traders say.

But many investors fear conditions could worsen as hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions come under pressure to cut their losses before conditions deteriorate further.

Liquidating structured credit instruments requires buying large amounts of protection using credit default swaps. This, in turn, drives the cost of protection higher, potentially triggering a chain reaction.

"There is potential for some wild and possibly inexplicable price movements as the unwinds get bigger," said Mehernosh Engineer, credit strategist at BNP.

The markets are so illiquid that a few trades can lead to sharp movements, producing violent price swings and knock-on effects.

Tim Bond, head of global asset allocation at Barclays Capital, said: "It's inflicting heavy losses on the banking system, eroding their capital and reducing their ability to lend. The spread widening is so severe, you're seeing a rise in borrowing rates across the board for everybody except top-quality governments. It's affecting both the price and availability of credit."

EDIT typo


Oh dear ph34r.gif
Liquidations all round then chaps laugh.gif
Noel
QUOTE (jonpo @ Mar 10 2008, 08:30 PM) *
Was this the "PAUL" I wonder ?
"The only solution I can think of which solves this riddle and gives you greeks is...not to trade these instruments! "

I have a signed copy of Nassim Nichloas Talebs' 'The black swan' he can read. its an excellent book for pricing instruments like these!


Jonpo,

I've read both of Taleb's books, but while both he and Mandelbrot describe the various shortcomings with current models, neither comes up with workable solutions
jonpo
QUOTE (Noel @ Mar 10 2008, 10:25 PM) *
Jonpo,

I've read both of Taleb's books, but while both he and Mandelbrot describe the various shortcomings with current models, neither comes up with workable solutions

Thats exactly my point Noel.

pricing some of these instruments may be the quantative finance eqivalent of a halting problem and I think thats what 'paul' is getting at too.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem
the ideas that Taleb is exploring are quite similar.

can the price of all financial instruments be computed?
not even slightly the pricing of many instruments is deeply recursive and self referential lets face it even a implied vol surface of a vanilla option is priced how! with reference to the past/itself? its a pure PIK.

How do you price a house ? you refer to houses on the same street perhaps ? deeply self referential.
can the value of a house be computed? sounds like a halting problem again....

sure there may be 'some' workable solutions, can you be sure you know everything/anything?
A.steve
QUOTE (Lets' get it right @ Aug 22 2007, 10:38 PM) *
What does 'moneytize' mean?


Assuming you're not correcting someone's spelling, I think I can tell you what "monetize" means.

We use a fiat system where our central bank issues currency... and, in order to do this, it demands collateral of equivalent value. So, for example, as a bank, I could take a £1Billion bond from the British Government to the central bank and borrow £1Billion against it... while paying interest on the loan - offset by the yield on the bond. The bond is said to have been monetized. When central banks accept other forms of collateral, that collateral is also said to have been monetized... and, arguably, when commercial banks engage in risky lending beyond that which they can safely underwrite (i.e. in a case where the FSA fails to regulate properly) assets are also monetized (arguably because the central bank will eventually be required to perform a rescue.)

So far, the Bank of England has relaxed its rules on forms of acceptable collateral - over the last few months - and now it includes "AAA" rated mortgage and credit card debt backed securities... though, for these, there are, apparently, mechanisms in place to make margin calls should their values be deemed to have fallen.
dazednconfused
QUOTE (jonpo @ Mar 11 2008, 12:21 AM) *
Thats exactly my point Noel.

pricing some of these instruments may be the quantative finance eqivalent of a halting problem and I think thats what 'paul' is getting at too.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem
the ideas that Taleb is exploring are quite similar.

can the price of all financial instruments be computed?
not even slightly the pricing of many instruments is deeply recursive and self referential lets face it even a implied vol surface of a vanilla option is priced how! with reference to the past/itself? its a pure PIK.

How do you price a house ? you refer to houses on the same street perhaps ? deeply self referential.
can the value of a house be computed? sounds like a halting problem again....

sure there may be 'some' workable solutions, can you be sure you know everything/anything?



You could just say it's a Ponzi scam - less typing for you and far more accessible to the majority.

tbatst2000
QUOTE (dazednconfused @ Mar 11 2008, 09:03 AM) *
You could just say it's a Ponzi scam - less typing for you and far more accessible to the majority.

No, it's not a Ponzi scam - it's not necessarily any more honest, but it is different. In a pure Ponzi scheme, there is no other money than that provided by the 'investors'. Money paid in by new investors is used to pay existing ones until the supply of new investors runs out. For a mortgage backed security, for example, there is money coming in from the people who are still paying their mortgages and the recovered value from selling the houses of those that aren't. The result might be the same - the investors lose their shirts - but the mechanism is different.
tbatst2000
QUOTE (jonpo @ Mar 11 2008, 12:21 AM) *
Thats exactly my point Noel.

pricing some of these instruments may be the quantative finance eqivalent of a halting problem and I think thats what 'paul' is getting at too.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem
the ideas that Taleb is exploring are quite similar.

can the price of all financial instruments be computed?
not even slightly the pricing of many instruments is deeply recursive and self referential lets face it even a implied vol surface of a vanilla option is priced how! with reference to the past/itself? its a pure PIK.

How do you price a house ? you refer to houses on the same street perhaps ? deeply self referential.
can the value of a house be computed? sounds like a halting problem again....

sure there may be 'some' workable solutions, can you be sure you know everything/anything?

Interesting idea...the proof of the halting problem is to assume that a solution exists and then show that implies that a solution can't exist (reductio ad absurdam), is it possible to come up with something similar for, say, a CDO? i.e. assume that it can be priced exactly theoretically and show that the existence of such a model necessarily implies that one can't exist? I'm inclined to think not at first sight, but I'd like to be proved wrong.
bleakhouse
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2008/mar/11/investmentfunds

QUOTE
Carlyle Capital begs nervous banks not to sell collateralCrisis-hit hedge fund seeks 'standstill agreement'


http://www.fintag.com/
Fintag commments

QUOTE
This story makes me very nervous. Is Carlyle the new LTCM?



Is this one going to be a trigger for nasty unwinding of leverage?
Noel
QUOTE (tbatst2000 @ Mar 11 2008, 10:09 AM) *
Interesting idea...the proof of the halting problem is to assume that a solution exists and then show that implies that a solution can't exist (reductio ad absurdam), is it possible to come up with something similar for, say, a CDO? i.e. assume that it can be priced exactly theoretically and show that the existence of such a model necessarily implies that one can't exist? I'm inclined to think not at first sight, but I'd like to be proved wrong.


From what I have been reading there are the following problems with CDO pricing using current Gaussian copula

1. Assumption that credit market follows normally distribution - Wim Scoutens is pushing the Levy process
2. Correlation - is one factor too simplistic to show correlation between 125 entities - Wilmott is investigating this
3. Lack of historical indices data - this will be solved given time

I did Wilmott's CQF last year hoping that it would have a lot of cutting edge credit research/models - there wasn't much at first but it appears to be getting better.
Noel
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 10 2008, 08:23 PM) *
Be aware that this is is far, far from over.

This is all you need to know and is 100% correct, guaranteed.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/af1e1c18-ee04-11dc...00779fd2ac.html

Credit derivatives turmoil strikes

By Robert Cookson and Joanna Chung in London and Michael Mackenzie in New York

Published: March 9 2008 18:42 | Last updated: March 9 2008 18:42

Turmoil in the credit derivatives markets is having an increasingly brutal impact on the wider financial system as a vicious cycle of forced selling drives risk premiums on company debt to new highs.

...

Institutions that lapped up credit risk products in recent years – many financing their purchases through borrowing – are scrambling to reduce their exposure following heavy losses, traders say.

But many investors fear conditions could worsen as hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions come under pressure to cut their losses before conditions deteriorate further.

Liquidating structured credit instruments requires buying large amounts of protection using credit default swaps. This, in turn, drives the cost of protection higher, potentially triggering a chain reaction.

“There is potential for some wild and possibly inexplicable price movements as the unwinds get bigger,” said Mehernosh Engineer, credit strategist at BNP.

The markets are so illiquid that a few trades can lead to sharp movements, producing violent price swings and knock-on effects.

Tim Bond, head of global asset allocation at Barclays Capital, said: “It’s inflicting heavy losses on the banking system, eroding their capital and reducing their ability to lend. The spread widening is so severe, you’re seeing a rise in borrowing rates across the board for everybody except top-quality governments. It’s affecting both the price and availability of credit.”

EDIT typo



"Liquidating structured credit instruments requires buying large amounts of protection using credit default swaps. "

surely indices

"The markets are so illiquid that a few trades can lead to sharp movements"

ITRAXX Europe. XOver and HiVol appear to have normal bid ask spreads and size according to CreditEx etc.

This article appears to be mostly 100% incorrect, guaranteed
cgnao
MUHAHAHAHHAHHAHHAHHAHAHAAAAHHAHAHA

Derivatives the new 'ticking bomb'
Buffett and Gross warn: $516 trillion bubble is a disaster waiting to happen
By Paul B. Farrell, MarketWatch
Last update: 7:31 p.m. EDT March 10, 2008

http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/deri...p;dist=printTop

ARROYO GRANDE, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- "Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength" wrote Warren Buffett. That was five years before the subprime-credit meltdown.

"We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly appreciative about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."

That warning was in Buffett's 2002 letter to Berkshire shareholders. He saw a future that many others chose to ignore. The Iraq war build-up was at a fever-pitch. The imagery of WMDs and a mushroom cloud fresh in his mind.

Also fresh on Buffett's mind: His acquisition of General Re four years earlier, about the time the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund almost killed the global monetary system. How? This is crucial: LTCM nearly killed the system with a relatively small $5 billion trading loss. Peanuts compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime-credit write-offs now making Wall Street's big shots look like amateurs.

Buffett tried to sell off Gen Re's derivatives group. No buyers. Unwinding it was costly, but led to his warning that derivatives are a "financial weapon of mass destruction." That was 2002.

Derivatives bubble explodes five times bigger in five years

Wall Street didn't listen to Buffett. Derivatives grew into a massive bubble, from about $100 trillion to $516 trillion by 2007. The new derivatives bubble was fueled by five key economic and political trends:

1. Sarbanes-Oxley increased corporate disclosures and government oversight
2. Federal Reserve's cheap money policies created the subprime-housing boom
3. War budgets burdened the U.S. Treasury and future entitlements programs
4. Trade deficits with China and others destroyed the value of the U.S. dollar
5. Oil and commodity rich nations demanding equity payments rather than debt

In short, despite Buffett's clear warnings, a massive new derivatives bubble is driving the domestic and global economies, a bubble that continues growing today parallel with the subprime-credit meltdown triggering a bear-recession.

Data on the five-fold growth of derivatives to $516 trillion in five years comes from the most recent survey by the Bank of International Settlements, the world's clearinghouse for central banks in Basel, Switzerland. The BIS is like the cashier's window at a racetrack or casino, where you'd place a bet or cash in chips, except on a massive scale: BIS is where the U.S. settles trade imbalances with Saudi Arabia for all that oil we guzzle and gives China IOUs for the tainted drugs and lead-based toys we buy.

To grasp how significant this five-fold bubble increase is, let's put that $516 trillion in the context of some other domestic and international monetary data:

• U.S. annual gross domestic product is about $15 trillion
• U.S. money supply is also about $15 trillion
• Current proposed U.S. federal budget is $3 trillion
• U.S. government's maximum legal debt is $9 trillion
• U.S. mutual fund companies manage about $12 trillion
• World's GDPs for all nations is approximately $50 trillion
• Unfunded Social Security and Medicare benefits $50 trillion to $65 trillion
• Total value of the world's real estate is estimated at about $75 trillion
• Total value of world's stock and bond markets is more than $100 trillion
• BIS valuation of world's derivatives back in 2002 was about $100 trillion
• BIS 2007 valuation of the world's derivatives is now a whopping $516 trillion

Moreover, the folks at BIS tell me their estimate of $516 trillion only includes "transactions in which a major private dealer (bank) is involved on at least one side of the transaction," but doesn't include private deals between two "non-reporting entities." They did, however, add that their reporting central banks estimate that the coverage of the survey is around 95% on average.

Also, keep in mind that while the $516 trillion "notional" value (maximum in case of a meltdown) of the deals is a good measure of the market's size, the 2007 BIS study notes that the $11 trillion "gross market values provides a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets."

Bubbles, domino effects and the 'bad 2%'

However, while that may be true as far as the parties to an individual deal, there are broader risks to the world's economies. Remember back in 1998 when LTCM's little $5 billion loss nearly brought down the world's banking system. That "domino effect" is now repeating many times over, straining the world's monetary, economic and political system as the subprime housing mess metastasizes, taking the U.S. stock market and the world economy down with it.

This cascading "domino effect" was brilliantly described in "The $300 Trillion Time Bomb: If Buffett can't figure out derivatives, can anybody?" published early last year in Portfolio magazine, a couple months before the subprime meltdown. Columnist Jesse Eisinger's $300 trillion figure came from an earlier study of the derivatives market as it was growing from $100 trillion to $516 trillion over five years. Eisinger concluded:

"There's nothing intrinsically scary about derivatives, except when the bad 2% blow up." Unfortunately, that "bad 2%" did blow up a few months afterwards, even as Bernanke and Paulson were assuring America that the subprime mess was "contained."

Bottom line: Little things leverage a heck of a big wallop. It only takes a little spark from a "bad 2% deal" to ignite this $516 trillion weapon of mass destruction. Think of this entire unregulated derivatives market like an unsecured, unpredictable nuclear bomb in a Pakistan stockpile. It's only a matter of time.

World's newest and biggest 'black market'

The fact is, derivatives have become the world's biggest "black market," exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today's slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.

Recently Pimco's bond fund king Bill Gross said "What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending so hard to understand that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke required a face-to-face refresher course from hedge fund managers in mid-August." In short, not only Warren Buffett, but Bond King Bill Gross, our Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the rest of America's leaders can't "figure out" the world's $516 trillion derivatives.

Why? Gross says we are creating a new "shadow banking system." Derivatives are now not just risk management tools. As Gross and others see it, the real problem is that derivatives are now a new way of creating money outside the normal central bank liquidity rules. How? Because they're private contracts between two companies or institutions.

BIS is primarily a records-keeper, a toothless tiger that merely collects data giving a legitimacy and false sense of security to this chaotic "shadow banking system" that has become the world's biggest "black market."

That's crucial, folks. Why? Because central banks require reserves like stock brokers require margins, something backing up the transaction. Derivatives don't. They're not "real money." They're paper promises closer to "Monopoly" money than real U.S. dollars.

And it takes place outside normal business channels, out there in the "free market." That's the wonderful world of derivatives, and it's creating a massive bubble that could soon implode.
Assurbanipal
Cgnao, what do you think about recent FED action? Will be efficient?
Methinkshe
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 12 2008, 07:07 AM) *
World's newest and biggest 'black market'

The fact is, derivatives have become the world's biggest "black market," exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today's slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.

Recently Pimco's bond fund king Bill Gross said "What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending so hard to understand that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke required a face-to-face refresher course from hedge fund managers in mid-August." In short, not only Warren Buffett, but Bond King Bill Gross, our Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the rest of America's leaders can't "figure out" the world's $516 trillion derivatives.

Why? Gross says we are creating a new "shadow banking system." Derivatives are now not just risk management tools. As Gross and others see it, the real problem is that derivatives are now a new way of creating money outside the normal central bank liquidity rules. How? Because they're private contracts between two companies or institutions.

BIS is primarily a records-keeper, a toothless tiger that merely collects data giving a legitimacy and false sense of security to this chaotic "shadow banking system" that has become the world's biggest "black market."

That's crucial, folks. Why? Because central banks require reserves like stock brokers require margins, something backing up the transaction. Derivatives don't. They're not "real money." They're paper promises closer to "Monopoly" money than real U.S. dollars.

And it takes place outside normal business channels, out there in the "free market." That's the wonderful world of derivatives, and it's creating a massive bubble that could soon implode.

Methinkshe
QUOTE (cgnao @ Mar 12 2008, 07:07 AM) *
*Snip*

World's newest and biggest 'black market'

The fact is, derivatives have become the world's biggest "black market," exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today's slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.

Recently Pimco's bond fund king Bill Gross said "What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending so hard to understand that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke required a face-to-face refresher course from hedge fund managers in mid-August." In short, not only Warren Buffett, but Bond King Bill Gross, our Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the rest of America's leaders can't "figure out" the world's $516 trillion derivatives.

Why? Gross says we are creating a new "shadow banking system." Derivatives are now not just risk management tools. As Gross and others see it, the real problem is that derivatives are now a new way of creating money outside the normal central bank liquidity rules. How? Because they're private contracts between two companies or institutions.

BIS is primarily a records-keeper, a toothless tiger that merely collects data giving a legitimacy and false sense of security to this chaotic "shadow banking system" that has become the world's biggest "black market."

That's crucial, folks. Why? Because central banks require reserves like stock brokers require margins, something backing up the transaction. Derivatives don't. They're not "real money." They're paper promises closer to "Monopoly" money than real U.S. dollars.

And it takes place outside normal business channels, out there in the "free market." That's the wonderful world of derivatives, and it's creating a massive bubble that could soon implode.


Excellent article.

This is the crux of the matter: derivatives do not represent real money. However because they interact with real money, when they turn bad they have the capacity to not only self-destruct but take down real wealth with them.
Noel
QUOTE (Methinkshe @ Mar 12 2008, 11:19 AM) *
Excellent article.

This is the crux of the matter: derivatives do not represent real money. However because they interact with real money, when they turn bad they have the capacity to not only self-destruct but take down real wealth with them.


So the cash flows are imaginary?
jonpo
ok i'll have a go bear in mind I got a D in A-level Maths so i'm certainly no quant myself... although after today derisory bonus i'd probably be open to offers.

consider that I am a bright young PHD student and manage to write a very clever algorithm to work out if a particular reference security is likely to default. lets call this the defaulting problem. as applied to millions of securities

INPUT: A derivative P and a reference entity I. We will think of P as a derivative of I.

OUTPUT: 1, if P defaults on I, and 0 if P pays out on I


Proof: Assume to reach a contradiction that there exists a Algorithm Default(P, I) that solves the Defaulting problem, Default(P, I) returns True if and only P Defaults on I. Then given this Algorithm for the Defaulting Problem, we could construct the following derivative Z:
QUOTE
Algorithm (ReferenceEntity x)

If Default(x, x) then
Don't default
Else Default.

End.

Consider what happens when a derivative on Algorithm Z is originated with Reference entity Z
Case 1: Algorithm Z Defaults on Reference Entity Z. Hence, by the correctness of the Default Algorithm, Default returns a Default on Reference Entity Z, Z. Hence, Algorithm Z dosn't default on Reference Entity Z. Contradiction.
Case 2: Algorithm Z doesn't default on Reference Entity Z. Hence, by the correctness of the Default Algorithm, Default returns false on Reference Entity Z, Z. Hence, Algorithm Z Defaults on Reference Entity Z. Contradiction.

Errol
warpig
retard

QUOTE (jonpo @ Mar 12 2008, 06:33 PM) *
bear in mind I got a D in A-level Maths

Noel
QUOTE (jonpo @ Mar 12 2008, 06:33 PM) *
ok i'll have a go bear in mind I got a D in A-level Maths so i'm certainly no quant myself... although after today derisory bonus i'd probably be open to offers.

consider that I am a bright young PHD student and manage to write a very clever algorithm to work out if a particular reference security is likely to default. lets call this the defaulting problem. as applied to millions of securities

INPUT: A derivative P and a reference entity I. We will think of P as a derivative of I.

OUTPUT: 1, if P defaults on I, and 0 if P pays out on I


Proof: Assume to reach a contradiction that there exists a Algorithm Default(P, I) that solves the Defaulting problem, Default(P, I) returns True if and only P Defaults on I. Then given this Algorithm for the Defaulting Problem, we could construct the following derivative Z:

Consider what happens when a derivative on Algorithm Z is originated with Reference entity Z
Case 1: Algorithm Z Defaults on Reference Entity Z. Hence, by the correctness of the Default Algorithm, Default returns a Default on Reference Entity Z, Z. Hence, Algorithm Z dosn't default on Reference Entity Z. Contradiction.
Case 2: Algorithm Z doesn't default on Reference Entity Z. Hence, by the correctness of the Default Algorithm, Default returns false on Reference Entity Z, Z. Hence, Algorithm Z Defaults on Reference Entity Z. Contradiction.


jonpo,

Surely a simpler approach is to look at the cds spread to work out the probability of an entity defaulting (assuming it is correctly pricing risk of default - it could be argued that it isn't at the moment)?
Assurbanipal
@jonpo

As far as I know, there are mathematical methods of determining probability of default. However, whole thing became more tricky when general conditions change. Particular assumption about broader market conditiuons determines choice of algoritm - when those conditions changes, math becames useles. I read few days ago even an artcile on Bloomberg about it - some algoritms show now more than 100% chance of default - what is utterly unlogical. Conditions changed, those algoritms are no longer applicable.
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